Legal Aspects
The subject allocated to me covers a multitude of matters; I shall omit National Insurance and Pensions' Tribunals and concentrate on certain aspects of civil actions for damages, especially those based on negligence. To co-ordinate law and medicine even in this limited sphere is not possible here, and I can only pinpoint certain vital matters and draw attention to some recent cases decided since the book of which I am joint author was published (Dix & Todd 1961, Medical Evidcnce in Personal Injury Cases. London).
Liability
The word 'accident' in this connexion is a misnomer, because a true accident cannot be blamed on anyone and no action for damages will lie; it is necessary to bring the incident complained of within the ambit of a legal cause of action such as negligence, breach of statutory duty, nuisance, breach of contract to carry safely, or liability under the Occupiers' Liability Act. First liability must be established, then the damages flowing from that liability must be assessed, and in both of these matters medical evidence based on informed medical opinion is vital.
A causal connexion between the negligent act and the personal injury must be proved. The law is now simpler to understand, and the test is foreseeability (The Waggon Mound, 1961, A.C. 388) . This means that the defendant is responsible for the type of injury caused if a reasonable man ought to have foreseen it; but foreseeability is not the test when considering the extent of the injury '(see Smith v. Leech Brain & Co. Ltd., below) .
The date of the onset of a disease may be vital, since proceedings in personal injury cases must be commenced within three years 'from the date on which the cause of action accrued', and personal injury includes any disease and any impairment of a person's physical or mental condition. In some diseases such as pneumoconiosis the onset of the disease is very difficult to establish. In Cartledge v. Jopling (1961, 3 All E.R. 482), a decision which is on its way to the House of Lords on appeal, Sellers L.J. foreshadowed a need for a change in the law. A committee appointed in 1961 by the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Scotland is at present sitting to consider 'whether legislation is desirable to amend the law relating to the limitation of actions in cases of personal injury, where the injury or disease giving rise to the claim has not become apparent in sufficient time to enable proceedings to be begun within three years of its inception'.
Cartledge v. Jopling arose out of a breach of statutory duty under the Factories Acts. The breach ceased when an improved system of ventilation was put in, and at that date none of the 10 workmen involved knew that he was suffering from pneumoconiosismanifestation of the disease came too late and all the actions were statute barred. The test is: when did the cause of action accrue? It accrues when the injury is inflictedbut the limitation period may pass before a reasonable man would think his symptoms serious enough to issue a writin Cartledge v. Jopling the period was still six years. A possible alteration might be to make the statutory period run from 'loss of faculty' from the disease.
Bonnington Castings Ltd. v. Wardlaw (1956, 1 All E.R. 615) is another case involving consideration of the cause of the pneumoconiosis resulting from the inhalation of silica dust by a workman. Undoubtedly the silica dust caused the disease, but the dust which he inhaled in the course of his work came from two sources, one 'innocent' and one 'guilty'. There was no known protection against the dust caused by the operation of pneumatic hammers, the main source of dust, but in the case of the swing grinders there was a breach of the relevant regulation requiring the dust extractor plant to be kept in good order. Did the 'guilty' dust contribute materially to the plaintiff's illness? The House of Lords held that it did, and he recovered damages.
Damages
In establishing liability the doctor will often have no part to play, but in the assessment of damages in a personal injury case his opinion will always be of vital importance at every stage of the action. The lawyer must try to assess human suffering and disablement in terms of £ s. d., an impossible task with any exactitude. Prognosis is the part of the doctor's report and subsequent evidence which matters most. Much depends on whether a report is interim or final, because damages are assessed once for all. Subject to the right of appeal, the decision of the Court is final, and even if the damage turns out to be much greater than originally supposed, no further action can be brought.
The issue of the Writ prevents the case becoming statute barred under the three-year rule, but the hearing is often delayed as long as possible until the extent and result of the injuries become more certain. There is something to be said for a change in procedure from the plaintiff's point of view, permitting liability to be decided while memories are still fresh, and the assessment of final damages to be deferred. This would, however, work hardship on an uninsured individual defendant, against whom the proceedings would be protracted; and from the medical point of view it might prolong accident neurosis.
Before leaving the subject of damages, I must refer to the significance of the pre-accident condition of the plaintiff. Although, in order to fix the defendant with liability for negligence, the initial injury must be reasonably foreseeable, the extent of the injury need not be foreseeable. The 'eggshell skull' cases are still good law, and the defendant must take the plaintiff as he finds him. A one-eyed man who loses his only eye is obviously entitled to greater damages than the man with both eyes; similarly, a hemophiliac will suffer a greater degree of injury. A recent example of this rule, in which Lord Parker C.J. explained the law, is the case of Smith v. Leech Brain & Co. Ltd. (1961, 2 All E.R. 1159). The proceedings were brought by the widow of a workman who, in the course of his employment, was spattered by molten metal causing a burnt lip. Negligence was proved. The burn was the promoting agent, promoting cancer in tissues which already had a premalignant condition. The damages were held not to be too remote.
At one time only physical injury was reflected in damages, but it is now recognized that mental shock may be compensated, and as psychiatry has progressed in subtlety, so the law has had to grapple with intricate distinctions. In writing a report or in giving evidence the medical practitioner should be careful to distinguish emotional or nervous shock from surgical shock.
The law has now reached the stage of dividing the consequences of nervous shock; for instance, in Schneider v. Eisovitch (1960, 2 Q.B. 430 ) the remoteness of damage rule was possibly stretched to its furthest point in favour of a plaintiff. The plaintiff, who suffered injuries at the same time as her husband was killed, was rendered unconscious. She did not hear of her husband's death till later. The shock of hearing this news was included as a head of damage in estimating the amount recoverable in her own cause of action. No damages were, however, awarded for the neurodermatitis suffered by the plaintiff, on the basis that shock perpetrated by a widow's day-to-day misery was too remote to entitle her to damages. In a Scots Case (Wood v. Miller (1958) S.L.T. (Notes) 47) (not cited to the Court in Schneider v. Eisovitch) a contrary view was taken, and it was held that a widow when Rot present or if present unaware, e.g. through unconsciousness, of her husband's injuries cannot recover for nervous shock caused by discovering those injuries. Presentation ofEvidence So far I have said a good deal about co-operation between doctor and lawyer in preparing a case and in crystallizing the issues. 'The doctor in the witness box,' to which I have been asked particularly to refer, raises more controversial matters; once in the witness box there is always the possibility and usually the certainty of crossexamination by opposing counsel. Medical witnesses often do not like being cross-examined, and as a human being I have some sympathy; until I had to give evidence in a motoring case I did not realize how disagreeable it could be, and I much prefer to be at the questioning end. But, as a lawyer, I cannot think of any better way of presenting evidence and probing evidence (once all efforts at compromise or agreement have failed) than the oral presentation of evidence on oath, in a public court, and subject to cross-examination. If the presiding judge does not protect a witness, whether one of fact or opinion, from improper questions by counsel, then he fails in his duty; but not all searching or even embarrassing questions are thereby improper. Upon the initiation of the British Medical Association, a joint committee of the General Council of the Bar, the Law Society and the British Medical Association is now deliberating on the presentation of medical evidence to Courts and Tribunals. Anyone feeling strongly on the subject should write to the Secretary of the committee.
Meanwhile, what advice can I give to potential medical witnesses?
(1) Do not give a lecture or make a speech; answer the question fully, fairly and to the point, and then wait for the next one.
(2) Try not to be impatient of our rules ofevidence. One which often irks a medical witness is the hearsay rule, which is aimed at securing the best evidence available. Information which is based on hearsay is proper in a written report but may become inadmissible in oral evidence. None the less, the hearsay rule has been relaxed to allow complaints of symptoms to be repeated in evidence.
(3) Do not be annoyed if you are asked what papers you hold in your hand. You may refer to original case notes to refresh your memory, provided they were made at or soon after the matters they describe.
(4) Particularly when there is a jury, do not lard your evidence with too much technical jargon; talk about a 'windpipe' or a 'gullet'. Tell us about the plaintiff's black eyewe can do without 'periorbital haematoma' or 'ecchymosis'. (5) Finally, remember that you are not there to win your patient's case for him. It should not be necessary to mention this, but there are perhaps some doctors who regard themselves as advocates. As an expert witness your position is privileged in that the rules of evidence allow you to express an opinion; a witness to mere fact may not express an opinion and will be stopped as soon as he tries to do so.
Dr Henry Miller
(Royal Victoria Infirmary, Newcastle upon Tyne) Accident Neurosis I use the term accident neurosis to describe a complaint of disabling functional nervous symptoms following accidental injury -and sometimes occurring after accidents which did not involve any physical injury, but merely perhaps something of a fright. The condition, known also as compensation or litigation neurosis, is familiar, and both physicians and surgeons often find themselves involved in the treatment of these very unrewarding patients. Amongst my own patients there are indeed few who have not undergone fruitless 'rehabilitation' either as outpatients in a department of orthopxedic surgery or physical medicine, or more formally at convalescent or reablement centres. Patients with accident neurosiswho are so notoriously unresponsive to any and every form of therapyoccasionally claim benefit from physical or psychiatric rehabilitation; but since they usually go on to state that their symptoms are in fact unchanged, it is difficult to see exactly what benefit has accruedexcept perhaps that their very reference for such a course of treatment has implied that somebody is taking their complaints seriously. In fact it implies nothing more than a failure to appreciate the natural history of one of the most stereotyped clinical syndromes in medicine: in an experience which covers many hundreds of cases I have yet to see a patient with accident neurosis cured by such treatment, and I cannot but regard it as an unmitigated waste of time and money.
I have already described the clinical features of this condition in my Milroy Lectures of a year ago (Miller 1961) . The following are the cardinal points: The condition is commoner in men than in women, and after industrial than following traffic accidents. It shows a predilection for the lower social and occupational classes, and it is characteristically also a complication of minor or trivial injury. It is common in the man who has sustained a cut hand, a back strain, a bruise, or a head injury without loss of consciousness, but relatively rare after a fractured skull or pelvis. It is not necessarily a complication of frightening accidents: disabling instances I have seen in the past few months have included a warehouseman whose ankle was bruised by a falling roll of linoleum, a woman who struck her buttock against the seat of a lurching bus, and a miner who fell from his bicycle on the way to work. Each of these claimants recovered completely from the very minor physical injury sustained, but they each lost more than eighteen months' employment because of purely nervous complaints. Accident neurosis is not seen in injured children, though some of their parents do their best to persuade them into it.
The average age of these patients is about 40, and accident neurosis is distinguished from every other kind of disabling neurotic breakdown in this age group by the fact that it often affects people who have never had any hint of previous nervous trouble. Some of these are people of limited intelligence and unstable occupational record, but even this is far from a general rule, and many claim robust physical and mental health and an excellent work record until the very day of the accident. But such a history is far from being; as is sometimes suggested in court, a touchstone of the genuineness of the condition. In fact, as a piece of evidence it points rather in the opposite direction. Initial neurotic breakdown in a man of 40 is almost unknown in medicine except as a response to truly catastrophic emotional stress, or as a symptom either of serious mental illness or organic disease. Minor accidents hardly fall into this class.
I have already mentioned resistance to treatment as an outstanding feature of this condition. Indeed the persistence of symptoms, unchanged, unremitting and oftenlike increasing pain at the site of minor injuryquite inexplicable on any rational pathological basis, unchanged from day to day, from month to month, and even from year to year, is unique in medicine both in the structurally and in the psychogenically determined spheres. These patients resist every form of therapy except settlement of the financial issue, after which, as I have shown in my own material, nine out of ten recover completely and without any form of treatment. The hard core in whom symptoms persist after settlement forms a small but interesting minority. I would hesitate to say that the recalcitrant cases can be predicted, because some symptoms which appear 'fixed' over many months (e.g. hysterical contracture of the hand and some occupational phobias) often melt away in the most remarkable manner when resolution of the cash issue has deprived them of their purpose. But there are a few clinical pointers. Patients with recalcitrant accident neurosis are usually below the average level of intelligence, and engaged in menial and unattractive work in keeping with their intellectual level. They are nearly always neurotically predisposed. They have practically all received generous financial compensation, and they are also in receipt of industrial injury benefit under the National Insurance Act, which, together with their capital gain, renders a return to uncongenial employment an unattractive and in the last resort an unnecessary proposition.
So much is certain, and especially when I take into account the kind of evidence offered in court by some of my psychiatric colleagues in cases of this kind, I must express surprise and even disappointment that my widely publicized formulation of the problem has evoked so much less reaction in psychiatric than in legal quarters.
Here, however, I am less concerned to go once more over this well-trodden ground than to try and prescribe a remedy. What can be done to mitigate the squalid waste of time and resources which this syndrome represents? Only the most starry-eyed idealist will invoke in this context the pious hopes for a 'change of heart' or a 'revolution in industrial relations' so beloved of leader-writers in the daily press. This substantial slice of social medicine is deeply embedded in the industrial and financial structure of society as it operates at this moment of history, and it is at this level that prophylaxis must be directed. Whether we like it or not, many (I do not say most) injured workmen regard the employer, or his substitute the insurance company, as fair game, and consider that to introduce moral considerations is no more germane here than in the property speculations or take-over bids about which they read daily in the newspapers. In fact these industrial workers are exploiting their, only assettheir labour. So long as it remains potentially profitableand sometimes very profitable indeedfor the trivially injured workman or motorist to fabricate his layman's parody of a nervous breakdown, and so long as conscientiously maintained malingering attracts substantial financial rewards, so long will accident neurosis flourish. This does not happen in France where Gallic logic rebels at a concept which allows the plaintiff to be the assessor not only of the reality but also of the severity of his entirely subjective complaints. Nor does it happen in Communist countries where the measurement of physical or mental suffering in financial terms is regarded as ludicrous, and where only rehabilitation is offered to the injured party. The English Law undoubtedly has its glories, but our method of dealing with this problem is not one of them. I would advise anyone who thinks that all is for the best in the best of possible legal worlds to walk into a provincial Assize Court sometime during the next few weeks and listen to the judge trying patiently to unravel the truth about an accident which occurred four years ago and into the facts of which his is the first judicial inquiry.
Accident neurosis is an entirely man-made disorder for which society in general and lawyers and doctors in particular must be held responsible. It is an unnecessary and almost entirely preventable condition even within the existing social and legal systems. I do not think it even needs the Government Enquiry that the Lancet suggested in its editorial on my lectures. The facts are clear. It occurs only after accidents which are potentially compensatable, it is inversely related to the severity of injury, it never occurs where the compensation factor is not involved, and it recovers without treatmentwin or losewhen the compensation issue is settled. From a nosological point of view it presents a spectrum ranging from frank malingering at one end of the scale to gross hysteria at the other. I often find it quite impossible to distinguish between these two conditions. But I am certain that very few of these patients are really ill in any ordinary sense, and that what is the matter with them is related to the desire for compensation and not directly to the injury or accident itself. We therefore have the paradoxical situation in which a condition caused by cupidity is fairly regularly rewarded by financial gain. I believe that this situation could be radically altered in either of two ways. The first would involve an alteration in the practice of the courts; the second, which would be less radical, would merely involve a change in administrative procedure. Of these the alteration in court practice would be the more effective and the more economical. It would demand the acceptance in court of the clearly established fact that accident neurosis is not a direct result of the accident, but of what is called a novus actus interveniensin this instance, the hope of financial compensation.
If this were established in a few test cases, accident 20 neurosis would have lost its raison d'etre and would disappear, as did such intriguing historical variants as 'railway spine'.
An alteration in procedure would not prevent accident neurosis, but would mitigate its worst evils, which are largely due to the law's delays. Less than one in ten of the cases ever come to trial, and most are settled by protracted legal haggling out of court. The average interval between accident and settlement or trial is two years. It is often much longer. The condition would be cut short if the facts about liability were firmly established by immediate inquiry at the site of the accident and if this issue came to trial within a few months. This would at any rate prevent the especially pointless cases where prolonged disablemenit follows an injury for which liability is ultimately disallowed at a trial long after the event. A few months after the settlement of the issue of liability the medical aspects of the case should be finally assessed and a firm decision reached about the amount of compensation. It might be necessary occasionally to defer medical assessment in the case of very severe injuries, or if there were a serious risk of important developments such as traumatic epilepsy, but neurotic complications are in any case rare with such serious injuries. An alteration of administrative procedure on these lines would be a less powerful contribution to solving this social problem than an alteration of practice, but it would do something to reduce the sum total of humbug and demoralization which must be laid at the door of accident neurosis to-day. Mathematical accuracy in the assessment of disability can never be achieved. While some approach to it in the estimation of physical disorders and defects can be made, the disability which results depends on many factors. Frequently it is reduced, sometimes to a remarkable degree, by adaptation, as in the case of Mrs Lumley, who, though she had no arms, successfully brought up a family of seven children, cooking, cleaning and even sewing for them.' But adaptation is always imperfect. In any role other than that of housewife, Mrs Lumley would have failed. Disablement must be related to the kind of work done by the injured person. Nor is disability present only during working hours. Its effect on travel to and from work, on recreations and hobbies (which, incidentally, may be financially rewarding), on personal independence and, together with disfigurement, on social relationships, are all of importance. Fortunately the doctor does not have to attempt to translate such matters into mathematical terms. But it is essential that, through his reports and his evidence, he should provide all the relevant information for those who do.
The physical effects of injury are not always permanent and unaltering. At examination, recovery is often still proceeding. Where this is the case, both the probable future speed of recovery and the probable degree of ultimate disability must be assessed. In the case of injuries to the limbs, this is not usually attempted until treatment is nearing completion. Then, a forecast of the probable duration of recovery and the severity of any handicap likely to persist is usually possible. The probability of the development of late sequele such as osteoarthritis can be estimated. It must be admitted, however, that both speed and completeness of recovery depend, often to a great extent, on the efficiency of continuing treatmentunder which heading must be included return to work which, if suitable, may be the best form of occupational therapy.
The situation is often different when injuries to the back or head are involved. Disabling back pain often persists in the absence of objective signs, and X-rays may be normal. On the other hand we frequently see patients w,vhose back pain and restriction of movement disappear with (or even without) treatment despite X-ray evidence of disc narrowing, osteoarthritis or even vertebral collapse. In both groups we find cases where compensation is an issue, and others where it is not. It is my impression that in these patients the presence or absence of a compensation issue is seldom of major importance in determining prognosis. If, in cases where compensation is involved, recovery appears unduly slow, factors other than compensation neurosis should be sought. Of these, lack of treatment is the most obvious, and is not uncommon. Occasionally, treatment is refused on the mere mention by the patient of compensation. In such cases, a good response is often obtained when treatment is given.
Untreated patients comprise only a small fraction of those compensation (or non-compensation) cases in whom back pain is persistent. Other factors must be involved. Some of these, certainly, are structural: the back is a complicated apparatus which has to perform complicated and force-ful tasks. It is also a sensitive structure, signalling with efficiency any abnormalities of structure or function. When as simple an apparatus as that for dorsiflexion of the wrist is subject to protracted disorganization after a minor injury in 'tennis elbow' it is not surprising that the complicated mechanism of the back is also often deranged. But there are other factors too. In the common view, the spine is a vital organ, and injuries to this region (as to the head) are especially feared. The widespread concept of the disc as an unstable structure which, with little provocation, 'slips' out of position, and which, once it has done this, is liable at any time to repeat the process, has done nothing to lessen the fear of back injury. Nor, we must admit, has the inability of the medical profession to give confident reassurance to its patients. Surely, apprehension of acute recurrence of pain, and fear of chronic invalidism and, perhaps, financial disaster, are a sufficient reason for the development of neurotic symptoms in such cases. These factors must operate in greater or lesser degree in a high proportion of our patients. Where compensation is also an issue, anxiety over a possible appearance in court, and uncertainty over the outcome are added.
Doubtless all these factors contribute to the severity and duration of disability. It is not necessary to assume that, when a patient makes a claim for compensation, he immediately undergoes a change of character. Some of the statistics which, at first sight, appear to support such a conclusion are based on highly selected material from which most or all patients in whom recovery has been satisfactory have been excluded. Even if a patient is a 'compensation case', justice demands that we assume that his disabilities, physical and psychological, are those of ordinary people, calling for study and, where possible, relief, until or unless we can prove to the contrary. Dr Samuel Hyde Dr Hyde was born in Cheshire in 1849 and was a medical student at King's College, London. In 1877, at the age of 28, he settled in Buxton and became the proprietor and Resident Physician of the Peak Hydropathic and Thermal Establishment. He is described as, 'a skilled and observant physician, somewhat deliberate, but painstaking and indefatigable in all his work, fond of literary avocations and caring little for ordinary recreations' (J. Balneol. Clim. 1900). He published articles entitled, 'The Causes and Treatment of Rheumatoid Arthritis', 'The Uses of Animal Extracts in Chronic Joint Affections', 'An Analysis of 200 Cases of Sciatica', 'Pure Air Treatment of Consumption', and 'The Treatment of Cardiac Affections, by Baths, Climate and Waters'. He died at the age of 50 on February 8, 1900. His obituary ends, 'others doubtless will build on the foundations he has laid'. He was the founder of the British Balneological and Climatological Society in 1896 and one of the last actions of that-society before its amalgamation with the Royal Society of Medicine was the foundation of this lecture to perpetuate Hyde's memory.
Ethics ofthe Experimental Trial Anyone who has spent any time in clinical trials will appreciate the formidable problems they present -ethical, administrative, organizational, financial, statistical and practical. I have tried to limit my scope by ignoring the advice of Bismarck (Reid 1954) that, 'only a fool learns from his own experience', by drawing largely on my own experience and the lessons I have learnt from it.
First, let us make no mistake about the fundamental point, that physical medicine is concerned, just as much as any other specialty, with treatment. Not, as some would have it, with treatment isolated from other aspects of medicine diagnosis, pathology, natural history of disease, and so ona view which we all agree is absurd, unsound and totally unscientific; nor is it concerned, as some used to claim, with physical therapy or physiotherapy in similar isolation, an equally absurd view. I make no excuse for quoting, as Bradford Hill did, when writing of the clinical trial (Hill 1951) , the words of Pickering in his Presidential Address to the Section of Experimental Medicine and Therapeutics of this Society (Pickering 1949) : '. . . therapeutics is the branch of medicine that, by its very nature, should be experimental'. 'For if we take a patient afflicted with a malady, and we alter his conditions of life, either by dieting him, or putting him to bed, or by administering to him a drug, or by performing on him an operation', and I might add, by
